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Abstract
This paper presents a general equilibrium analysis on the interactions between pen-
sion plan funding, capital structure, technology choice and the equity premium. The
paper shows that economies with large funded dened pension schemes may be biased
towards safe production. The pricipal results derive from the existence of borrowing
and short sales constraints. In the rst scenario workers are constrained in the capital
market and debt is risk-free. If pension benets are su¢ ciently high, then the cap-
ital market constraint may be binding. Then, leveraging the risky technology gives
workers an adjustment channel through which they may undo an over-exposure to
risk-free investment. This results in more risky production and a fall in the equity
premium. In the second scenario workers are constrained in the capital market and
debt is subject to default risk. If the level of the resulting pension plan shortfall risk
is low and if pension benets are su¢ ciently high, then the previous is at work. If
the level of shortfall risk is high, workers hedge themselves by holding risk-free assets
and the constraint in the capital market is no longer binding. Then the risky rm
does not benet from leveraging and there is more safe production in the economy.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the question of how the level of pension plan benets and funding
a¤ect risk bearing and the composition of investment in the economy as a whole and
how this relationship interacts with the nancial leverage of the corporate sector?
Economies such as the United Kingdom and the United States have large funded
occupational pension schemes, including both dened benet and dened contribution
plans, which are part of workersoverall compensation packages. The returns on plan
assets are used to pay pensions. The principal di¤erence between the two types
of plan is in who bears the return risk for solvent plans. In either case the plans
are the principal source of retirement income for many workers. Dened contribution
schemes are frequently life-style, so that at retirement they are predominantly invested
in bonds, but are balanced between equities and bonds in the earlier accumulation
phase. Dened benet plans typically have high equity weightings (70 percent is
common) but o¤er beneciaries a xed (indexed) promise at retirement. In the United
Kingdom both dened contribution and dened benet plans must buy an annuity
at some stage before the retiree is 75, or forfeit the tax exemptions for payments into
the plan. The annuities are usually bought from insurance companies who in order
to meet payments demand longer maturity government bonds and high-grade (low
risk of default) corporate bonds. Abstracting from issues relating to the supply and
maturity structure of government bonds, the role of the corporate sector in supplying
these income streams will have implications for corporate capital structure and the
investment behaviour of the economy.
A central concern of this paper is the allocation of risk-bearing between house-
holds. In a number of papers (for example Storesletten et al (2007)) older middle
aged workers who have relatively high net worth and relatively low human capital
have a relatively high appetite for holding risky assets. Younger workers on the other
hand, have high levels of human capital, which exposes them to background risk (for
example, labour endowment shocks) and thereby limits their appetite for holding
risky assets. They assume that retired workers only hold riskless assets. Models such
as that of Storesletten et al (2007), with overlapping generations of three-period lived
individuals allow us to understand the balance of risk bearing between generations
in the economy, linking it to the age distribution of the population and the empir-
ical wealth distribution across generations. These models are notoriously di¢ cult
to analyse but they are at the heart of research aimed at capturing the empirical
interactions of life-cycle asset accumulation patterns and asset pricing.
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The present paper is more modest than the above. Its aim is to understand
aspects of the interaction of asset demand and investment behaviour and in particular
the impact of funded pension plans on economic equilibrium. In order to do this,
rather than having risk bearing evolve over the life-cycle, we take an alternative
static approach. In particular, we assume that at each date there are two types of
individual, namely rentiers and workers. In the model the two types of individual have
strictly di¤erentiated roles. The rentiers have high capital endowments (like the older
middle aged) and have a high appetite for risk bearing. The workers have a labour
endowment, which is not subject to background risk and no capital endowment; they
are assumed to be poorer than rentiers and so have a low appetite for risk bearing.
The paper then provides an analysis of the impact of the type of occupational
pension plan and its funding on workerssaving and portfolio behaviour on risk sharing
between workers and rentiers; and the implications for the economys technology
choices. The basic framework is similar to that in Diamond and Geanakoplos (2004).
In our model there are two technologies: a safe and a risky technology. Only the
risky technology employs workers, who are paid wages and receive a pension promise.
The pension can be a funded dened contribution plan or a dened benet plan, but
the principal focus of this paper is on the latter. We abstract from issues to do with
intergenerational risk sharing, social security and the role of long-lived assets.1 In our
economy agents cannot short-sell assets and workers are unable to borrow against
pension plan assets. Financial claims are held by rentiers, workers and the pension
plan. Since in the model there is a single risky technology there is no distinction
between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. Workers exposure to risk is therefore either
though their choosing to hold shares in the risky technology or through the pension
plan.
In the basic model in the paper, without company nancial policy, the failure
of equivalence propositions between dened benet and dened contribution pension
plans derives from the existence of capital market constraints. The two types of plan
force workers against the constraints di¤erently (the dened contribution plan may
itself be neutral) yielding an asymmetric impact on risk taking, the aggregate risk
premium and technological choices.
In the case of a dened benet pension, the plan sponsor bears the risk of any
shortfall between the return on the plans investments and the pension benet. If
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Abel (2001) and Bohn (1997) both provide models with technology risk but focus on social security
and intergenerational risk sharing.
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the plan sponsor issues risky debt, then in the event of default, if the pension plan is
not fully funded (or insured), this shortfall risk is borne by the plan members. We
show that when capital market constraints on workers are binding, leveraging the
risky technology, even with risky debt, raises risky production and can reduce the
aggregate risk premium.
When the pension plan is dened benet, it is exposed to shortfall risk, if the
sponsor is nanced with risky debt and defaults on risky debt leaving an unfunded
decit. This means that the workers are in turn exposed to technology risk. The
workers(pension plan trustees) e¤ort to hedge this risk, essentially transferring it
back to rentiers, is a key concern of the paper. A key prediction of the paper is to
show that when pension plan shortfall risk is large and the dominant factor is that
of hedging pension plan shortfalls, workersdemand for levered-equity declines with
increases in leverage, so that the cost of capital of the risky technology does not
benet from further debt issues. The existence of high levels of pension benets and
shortfall risk then biases the economy towards safe production. This may be a partial
explanation of the low cost of capital in the United Kingdom a¤orded companies
with stable income streams and signicant collateral assets such as major retailers
like Marks and Spencer and Tesco, which have been able to issue low yield long-dated
debt for which annuity providers have a strong appetite.
The plan of the paper is as follows: The rst Section of the paper outlines the basic
model focussing on the technologies of the economy and the simple lifetime allocation
problems of rentiers and workers, where the behaviour incorporates the contributions
and returns to pension plans. Section 2 outlines the equilibrium properties of the
model, including the determination of asset prices, investment in the economys two
technologies and the aggregate risk premium under both dened contribution and
dened benet pensions. Section 3 shows the impact of the dened benet pension
plan on the equilibrium of the model when workers do not save on personal account
and when they do but are subject to borrowing and short sales constraints. Section
4 introduces corporate nancial policy. The focus of this section is on understanding
how leveraging the risky technology may alleviate the constraint of the dened benet
pension on the workers allocation problem and reduce the distorting e¤ect that it has
on the production decisions of the economy. To do this we rst show what is necessary
to achieve neutrality of corporate nancial policy with riskless debt. Assuming that
there is no pension plan shortfall risk, we show that neutrality breaks down when
the dened benet pension constraint is binding. The implications for asset prices,
technology choices and the aggregate risk premium are then illustrated. The same
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exercise is then repeated for the case of risky (presence of default risk) debt. Section 5
of the paper considers pension plan shortfall risk and how this interacts with company
default risk. The e¤ect of shortfall risk depends crucially upon its relative magnitude
and the probability of the risky company defaulting. In particular, if the level of
shortfall risk is high, workers hedge themselves by holding risk-free assets and the
borrowing constraint is no longer binding. Then the risky rm does not benet from
leveraging and there is more safe production in the economy. The nal section of the
paper is the conclusions.
2 Basic Framework
Production takes place though two technologies, a safe technology and a risky technol-
ogy. Labour is only employed in the risky technology. Claims to the two technologies
are sold as shares. At each date there are two groups of agents with two-period lives,
workers and rentiers; each represented by a single risk-averse member. Agents are
assumed to be rational and able to make optimal nancial decisions.2 The economy
does not permit the short-selling of claims on technologiess income streams.
Rentiers have an initial endowment that can be consumed or allocated to produc-
tion in the two technologies. If the risky technology is active, rentiers must employ
workers at the cost of wages and pensions. They either consume or save the residual
to nance retirement consumption. Saving takes the form of accumulating claims on
the two technologies.
The workers endowment takes the form of a xed amount of labour that they
supply (inelastically) when young. They divide their income between current con-
sumption and saving to nance retirement consumption, which takes the form of ac-
cumulating claims on the two technologies. These claims are purchased from rentiers.
Workers retirement consumption is also partly nanced by a funded occupational
pension plan. There is no pay as you go pension scheme, so that we abstract from
any trade between generations.
Production decisions are made by rentiers before any shares are sold to the pension
plan or to workers, but with rentiers anticipating the market clearing prices for shares
in the safe and risky technologies.
The labour contract has two components, a wage and an (occupational) pension.
2An important di¤erence between the present set up and that of Diamond and Geanakoplos (2004)
is that we do not assume that individuals second period preferences are dened over composite safe
and composite risky consumption. However, that said the framework employed and the technology
assumptions are close to theirs.
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The specic features of the relationship of capital to labour in production and the
labour and capital market conditions that determine the mix of wages and pension
are not modelled. Indeed, the particular type of pension plan is exogenous. If one
particular type of pension is given exogenously, this can be justied by a pension plan
contracting cost. If this cost were to go to zero, the more e¢ cient contract from a risk
sharing perspective would imply lower employment costs and dominate on e¢ ciency
grounds.
2.1 Technologies
The two technologies:
A. A safe technology that only invests capital. An investment at date t of k0t in
the safe technology yields (k0t) at date t + 1 with 
0 > 0 and 00 < 0: The return
to investors per unit of capital invested in this technology will be given by Rt+1 =
(k0t).
B. A risky technology that employs an inelastic supply of labour at a xed cost
of production, zt, and capital as a variable cost. Payment of zt and an investment
of k1t yields output net of xed labour costs of Rt+1g(k1t), where R

t+1 is stochas-
tic. The production function g(k1t) is stochastic with g0 > 0, and g00 < 0. Notice
that with this technology, labour must be employed at its reservation compensation
level before capital is applied at the prot maximising level. An alternative way of
making the same point is that rentiers transfer part of their endowment to workers
so as to induce them to participate in risky production and so make it active. This
technological assumption is a strong one but allows us to focus on the allocation of
capital. Moreover, it means that our model does not require a labour market clearing
condition. This assumption has little cost to the analysis in the paper as there is no
labour risk in the form of labour endowment shocks.
In addition, we assume that there is a range of investments in the two technolo-
gies in which the risky technology yields higher expected returns than the riskless
technology.
The cost of labour, zt; comprises the wage cost, wt, plus the pension contribution,
ft. In this set up the workers compensation package is a xed cost of production with
the package of wages and pension benet, bt+1, determined to satisfy the workers
exogenous labour market participation condition. The employment level and the
compensation paid to labour is independent of the technology shock. This is a strong
assumption that greatly simplies the analysis and allows us to focus entirely on
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shocks to the productivity of capital. The cost of labour, zt, could, however, be made
a function of the type of pension plan. Then, depending upon exogenous costs, noted
in the introduction, the cost of the employment contract can itself include transaction
costs that depend upon the type of pension plan chosen. However, here we simply
take the type of pension plan as given. Finally, at this stage we introduce a term for
the pension decit, dt+1, which arises when the return on a dened benet pension
fund does not cover the pension plan liabilities.
2.2 Individuals
2.2.1 Rentiers
The representative rentier, indexed by s, has an additive, strictly concave, utility func-
tion, U . The subscript t refers to the individuals birth date; y and o refer respectively
to youth and old age. The rentier has an exogenously given positive endowment of esyt.
Income at date t is used to hire workers for zt; to nance young consumption, csyt; and
savings of asyt. The savings are used to purchase claims on the safe and risky technol-
ogy. The income stream from these investments is used to nance consumption when
old, csot. We denote the rentiershares in the income streams of the two technologies
by sjt, j = 0; 1; which due to the short-sales constraints are non-negative. The rep-
resentative rentier chooses asyt and fs0t,s1tg  0 to solve the following optimisation
problem that follows along lines similar to Diamond and Geanakopolos (2003). Let
pt = 1=Rt+1 denote the date t price of one unit of riskless consumption at date t+ 1
in terms of date t consumption; and let qt denote the date t price of risky capital and
qt the price of risky consumption date t+ 1. Then we can write
maxfU(csyt) + EtU(csot)g (1)
subject to
esyt   zt = csyt + asyt; (2)
asyt = 
s
0tptk0t + 
s
1tqtk1t; (3)
and
csot = 
s
0t(k0t) + 
s
1t(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1): (4)
Note that the rentier has an obligation to the pension at date t through the term zt
but also through the decit term dt+1.
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Consider the unconstrained optimisation problem of the representative rentier who
holds both riskless and risky assets. The rst-order conditions for the asset shares
are,
ptU
0(csyt) = Et[U
0(csot)]; (5)
and
qtU
0(csyt) = Et[U
0(csot)(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1)]=k1t: (6)
Dening mst = U
0(csot)=U
0(csyt) as the stochastic discount factor, we can write
pt = Etm
s
t (7)
and
qt = Et[m
s
t(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1)]=k1t = (8)
[ptEt(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1) + cov(mst ; Rt+1g(k1t)  dt+1)]=k1t
Hence when the agent buys a risky asset he is buying expected income plus covariance.
Since csot and R

t+1 are perfectly (positively) correlated, U
0(csot) and R

t+1 are negatively
correlated the covariance is negative.
If the pension is always fully funded so that dt = 0 in all states, we can write
qtk1t = q

t g(k1t)  Etmst(dt+1) (9)
where qt = Etm
s
t(R

t+1)
Note here that this allows us to substitute qt g(k1t) for qtk1t in the subsequent analysis.
With additive utility, if the utility function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA) and increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA), then as shown in Aura et al
(2002), current consumption and the riskless and risky assets are normal goods and
net substitutes.
2.2.2 Workers
The representative worker has an additive, strictly concave, utility function, W . The
utility function again exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. Workers are poorer
than rentiers. But in the present paper the holding patterns of safe and risky assets
are driven by constraints
The worker supplies a unit of labour inelastically to the risky technology. He
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receives wages of wt and a pension benet of bt+1. The package of wages and pension
benets is determined to satisfy an exogenous participation condition, so that utility
must be at least equal to W .3 If the pension plan is dened benet and is exposed to
sponsor default risk, the package of wages and benets should adjust to reect this
risk to ensure worker participation.
The workers saving on personal account is denoted by a!yt, which is divided be-
tween holding a fraction of the economys safe assets, !0t, and risky assets, 
!
1t.
Current income net of savings is used to nance consumption when young, c!yt. Old
consumption is determined by the return on personal saving and the pension plan
benet, bt+1. The workers optimisation problem involves choosing a!yt and again be-
cause of the short-sales constraint, f!0t; !1tg  0. In solving the optimisation problem
the pension plan is taken as given. The workers problem is stated as:
maxfW (c!yt) + Et[W (c!ot)]g (10)
subject to
wt = c
!
yt + a
!
yt; (11)
a!yt = 
!
0tptk0t + 
!
1tqtk1t; (12)
and
c!ot = 
!
0t(k0t) + 
!
1t[(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1)] + bt+1: (13)
The rst-order conditions for an interior optimum for the workers asset shares take
the same general form as in (5) and (6). Moreover, with the same assumptions on
the form of the workers utility function as that of the rentiers, all goods and assets
are normal and net substitutes.
In this framework workers will demand stocks. However, Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991) nd that only a small portion (about 27 percent) of investors participate in
the stock market; in their sample, of those with liquid assets in excess of $100,000,
only 47.7 percent hold stocks. Limited participation can to some extent be explained
by transaction costs (Allen and Gale (1994)) or non-expected utility (Dow and Wer-
lang (1992)).4 The basic analysis here lets workers hold positive amounts of stock.
3In the model we present, workers do not share production risk directly with rentiers through
their wages being a¤ected by shocks, as is the case in much of the real business cycle literature.
Danthine and Donaldson (2001), for example, examine an innite horizon model in which workers
have no access to capital markets but in which shocks are shared with rentiers though variations in
wages and laboursshare in income.
4There are also behavioural arguments, such as misperception of risks or limited information
regarding opportunities.
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However, later in this paper it is shown that if they are exposed to signicant com-
pany risk through possible default on the pension, they will demand low amounts
of equity. Clearly if there are participation costs in the equity market, risk averse
workers may choose not to participate in the equity market at all.
2.3 The Pension Plan
There are two types of pension: dened contribution and dened benet. Here the
type of pension is exogenously determined but as already noted, in a more complete
model the type of pension plan will be endogenous.5 For simplicity, we assume that
workers themselves make no contributions to their (occupational) pension plan.
In the case of a dened contribution pension, rentiers make an immediate transfer
to workers of wages, wt, and make a contribution, fDCt , to the pension plan. The
total cost to rentiers of employing labour is zt = wt + fDCt . The investment policy
of the pension plan is chosen either by the workers themselves or their agents. In
this case, with a dened contribution pension plan, pension plan risk is borne by the
worker.
With a dened benet plan, rentiers make an immediate transfer of wages, wt,
and promise workers a future pension benet of bt+1 and pay fDBt into a pension
plan. The package of wages and pension benets is determined to ensure that the
worker supplies labour. The plan sponsor determines the plans investment policy.6
If the return on the pension plan assets is insu¢ cient to meet the pension promise,
the sponsor must make up the decit with an additional contribution at date t + 1
of dt+1, which is deducted from the rms income before distribution to investors. If
there is a surplus, this will be captured by the sponsor. Note that the risk to the
pension plan sponsor rises with the holding of risky assets. In the event that the
sponsor defaults then any pension plan shortfall is a loss to the beneciaries.
5For example, dened benet pension plans can act as a commitment mechanism for bargaining
with workers over current levels of wages. The rm can promise to put more money into the pension
plan in return for workers foregoing current wages, but it may not be able to commit to giving
improved levels of compensation in future wages (see Ippolito, 1985). A dened benet pension
is deferred compensation, the value of which is tied to the economic success of the plan sponsor.
Workers are then committed to supplying high e¤ort levels over the long-run and do not gain from
quitting or collectively shirking. If this is true, then rms have an incentive to let the company
pension plan run a decit and lever the rms capital structure, so as to subject workers to the risk
of default on their pensions should the rm perform poorly. However, an e¢ cient trade-o¤ between
risk sharing and long-run e¤ort incentives can be achieved with a combination of a dened benet
pension plan and a long-term labour contract with e¢ ciency wages (see Lazear (1985)).
6We also abstract from the conicts that may arise, resulting from whether it is the plan sponsor
or the beneciaries that determine the plans investment policy.
9
Let f0t and 
f
1t denote the shares of the economys safe and risky technologies
held by the pension plan, so that
ft = 
f
0tptk0t + 
f
1tqtk1t: (14)
where ft 2 ffDCt ; fDBt g. The benets of a dened contribution pension plan are given
by the return on this portfolio,
bt+1 = 
f
0t(k0t) + 
f
1t(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1). (15)
In the case of a dened benet pension plan, the benet and date t + 1 and
additional contributions for the plan are respectively:
bt+1 = bt+1; (16)
and dt+1 = bt+1   f0t(k0t)  f1t(Rt+1g(k1t)  dt+1).
Here, if f1t > 0, dt+1 is a random variable. From an actuarial perspective, even if
Etdt+1 = 0, then if 
f
1t > 0, the pension plan will impose unexpected losses on the
sponsor. At this stage of the paper we assume that with a dened benet pension
the benet, bt+1, is always paid, so that if 
f
1t > 0, dt+1 can always be covered by the
income from the risky technology.
2.4 Equilibrium
In our model production decisions are made by rentiers before any shares are sold
to the pension plan or to workers. However, rentiers anticipate the market clearing
prices for shares in the safe and risky technologies before these decisions are made.
In presenting the equilibrium we assume that in the case of a dened benet pension
plan the plan does not incur a decit, dt+1 = 0 for all states.
First consider the safe technology. Consider the unconstrained optimisation prob-
lem of the representative rentier who holds risky assets. pt = 1=Rt+! is the present
value of a unit of date t+1 safe production in terms of numeraire current consumption.
Let V0t denote the market value of the safe technology, then
V0t = pt(k0t): (17)
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Assuming competitive behaviour, k0t is chosen to maximise Vt   k0t:
pt
0(k0t)  1 = 0: (18)
Now consider the risky technology. As we have stochastic constant returns to
scale we can write the value of the risky technology as V1t = qt g(k1t). Assuming
competitive behaviour, value maximisation implies that k1t maximises V1t   k1t and
satises:7
qt g
0(k1t)  1 = 0: (19)
The technology will be operated at the optimal level provided the exogenous labour
costs, zt, are covered.
Equilibrium requires that the markets for current (date t) consumption and asset
markets clear and that rms are making optimal investment decisions. Because of
WalrasLaw, we can drop the current consumption goods market and consider only
the markets for safe and risky assets. In stationary equilibrium, prices and young
workers and rentiers consumption and asset holdings are constant through time and
across states of nature. All that varies is output, consumption of the old workers
and old rentiers and the return on the pension plan. With a single consumption
good and stationary and independent productivity shocks, stationary equilibrium will
exist. Each period a new steady state is reached, starting with the generation born
immediately after a permanent parameter change. That is our two period economy
repeats itself.8
It will be seen immediately that the equilibrium of the model yields a posi-
tive (expected) aggregate risk-premium. The expected return on equity is given
Et(R

t+1g(k1t))=k1t. The (expected) aggregate risk premium is dened as
Et(R

t+1g(k1t))=k1t  Rt+1=k0t; (20)
From the rentiers optimisation problem,
Et[U
0(csot)(R

t+1g(k1t))=k1t] = Et[U
0(csot)Rt+1]: (21)
7Note that with constant stochastic returns to scale, Et(dt+1) only depends upon the composition
the investment policy of the pension plan and not on the scale of investment in the risky technology.
Moreover, if the pension plan is fully funded Et(dt+1) = 0.
8Note that in the paper we only compare allocations given exogenous changes in pension plan
policy. We do not consider anticipated changes in pension policy, that would occur in dynamic
models that allow sponsors to react to anticipated shortfalls.
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Since csot and R

t+1 are perfectly (positively) correlated, U
0(csot) and R

t+1 are negatively
correlated. Hence Et(g(k1t)Rt+1)=k1t > Rt+1=k0t.
In a complete nancial market, for any given contribution policy to the pension
plan, ft, the asset allocation policy of the plan (
f
0t; 
f
1t) will will not a¤ect the
equilibrium prices or consumption and investment. In an incomplete nancial market,
however, an exogenously determined pension plan asset allocation policy can have real
implications for asset holding in the economy and consequently for the prices of assets
and the choice of technology. There are two polar cases: If the plan is dened benet,
provided workers consolidate the plan in their budget sets and are at an interior
optimum, we obtain an equilibrium in which the funding and benet level of the
pension plan is irrelevant. On the other hand, if the worker is forced to a corner
solution though the holding of riskless assets by the pension plan, the neutrality
property breaks down. If on the other hand, the pension plan is dened contribution,
holding contribution levels xed, if the worker chooses the asset allocation policy of
the pension plan, he will consolidate this with his private portfolio decisions and we
obtain neutrality. But if the contribution level and asset allocation decision of the
pension plan are not made by the workers but by plan managers, the workers may
want to undo on personal account the asset allocation of the plan. Again, due to
the possibility of corner solutions, neutrality can break down. However, our primary
focus in the paper is on dened benet plans.
2.5 Equilibrium with Dened Contribution Pensions
The economy has three markets at date t; namely for current consumption, and for
safe and risky assets. Current consumption and safe and risky assets are to be normal
goods and net substitutes. In the case of a dened contribution pension plan, the
workers and rentiers demand functions for safe assets are
!0tptk0t = H
!
t (pt; q

t ; zt; 
f
0tk0t) (22)
and s0tptk0t = H
s
t (pt; q

t ; e
s
t   zt).
The demand functions for risky assets are:
!1tq

t g(k1t) = J
!
t (pt; q

t ; zt; 
f
1tk1t) (23)
and s1tq

t g(k1t) = J
s
t (pt; q

t ; e
s
t   zt) for the risky assets;
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where we have used (9). In these conditions zt = wt + fDCt ; with H
i
t1 < 0; H
i
t2 > 0;
H it3 > 0 and J
i
t1 > 0; J
i
t2 < 0; J
i
t3 > 0; H
i
t1 + J
i
t1 = 0, H
i
t2 + J
i
t2 = 0 and H
i
t3 + J
i
t3 = 1
i = !; s. Finally, H!t4 and J
!
t4 are both equal to  1, so that holdings of riskless
and risky assets in the dened contribution pension plan lead to equal o¤sets in
non-pension plan demand. We do not write down the demand functions for current
consumption but note that they take the same form as the asset demand functions.
The equilibrium with dened contribution pensions the values fpt; qt ; k0t; k1tg sat-
isfy (18) and (19), as well as
H!t (pt; q

t ; zt; 
f
0tk0t) +H
s
t (pt; q

t ; e
s
t   zt) + f0tptk0t = ptk0t; (24)
and
J!t (pt; q

t ; zt; 
f
1tk1t) + J
s
t (pt; q

t ; e
s
t   zt) + f1tqt g(k1t) = qt g(k1t); (25)
where the asset holdings of the pension plan, f0tptk0t and 
f
1tq

t g(k1t), are taken as
given.9
If the worker is at an interior optimum, then H!t > 0 and J
!
t > 0. Hence, if
fDCt is constant and its composition changes, then dH
!
t + d(
f
0tk0t) = 0 and dJ
!
t +
d(f1tk1t) = 0. Changes in contributions to the pension plan, f
DC
t , lead to changes
in wages, wt, such that dwt =  dfDCt . As zt does not change, the rentiers asset
demand functions are una¤ected. Hence without writing down the market equilibrium
conditions we conclude that in this environment in which the dened benet pension
plan is fully integrated with other elements of the workers intertemporal problem we
obtain neutrality.
If as noted above there is an agency problem or some other friction which prevents
the above consolidation, then a dened contribution plan could force capital market
constraints, either borrowing or short-sales constraints to bind for workers. Then the
above neutrality property will break down. However, as the principal concern of this
paper is with dened benet pensions, we do not demonstrate this here.
2.6 Equilibrium with Dened Benet Pensions
With a dened benet pension plan, the workers demand functions are
9Conditions (18) and (19) can be substituted into (24) and (25) to form two equations in two
unknowns, k0t and k1t. These equations can be linearised in the neighbourhood of equilibrium.
For k0t and k1t both positive, the Jacobian matrix is invertible with a negative determinant. The
comparative statics of the system with respect to the exogenous pensions parameters then follow.
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!0tptk0t = H
!
t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt+1) for safe assets (26)
and !1tq

t g(k1t) = J
!
t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt+1) for the risky assets.
The rentiers demand functions for safe and risky assets are the same as (22) and (23),
with zt = wt + fDBt . Changes in the composition of the pension plan investments
have no e¤ect on the asset demands of workers if bt+1 is unchanged. At an interior
optimum, changes in the benet level, bt+1, a¤ect asset demand through changes in
wages, such that H!3 dwt + H
!
4 dbt+1 = 0, with H
!
4 =  1. In a constrained optimum
in which 0t  0 binds and H!3 = 0, so that the worker demand for riskless assets is
zero and does not vary with marginal changes in wages. Then if bt+1increases, cuts in
wages will result in reduced demand for the risky asset not the riskless asset as none
is held. Alternatively, if bt+1 is cut all increases in wages will be used to purchase the
risky asset.
Hence, in the equilibrium with dened benet pensions the values fpt; qt ; k0t; k1tg
satisfy (18) and (19), as well as
H!t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt+1) +H
s
t (pt; q

t ; e
s
t   zt) + f0tptk0t = ptk0t; (27)
and
J!t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt+1) + J
s
t (pt; q

t ; e
s
t   zt) + f1tqt g(k1t) = qt g(k1t); (28)
where again the asset holdings of the pension plan, f0tptk0t and 
f
1tq

t g(k1t), are taken
as given. In the next section we examine in more detail the the impact of the dened
benet pension plan on the equilibrium of the model with borrowing and short-sales
constraints.
3 The Dened Benet Pension Constraint and Equi-
librium
The impact of the dened benet pension plan on the equilibrium of the model is
understood by rst considering the case when workers do not save on personal account
and then when they do but are subject to borrowing and short sales constraints.
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3.1 Workers do not Save on Personal Account
We begin by assuming workers do not save on personal account, a!yt = 0.
10. Suppose
that the pension plan were to invest only in safe assets then workers bear no risk
and rentiers bear all the risk. Moreover, this means that dt+1 = 0 for all Rt+1. To
pay for this insurance workerswages are relatively lower at date t. The pension
plan holds only riskless claims against the safe technology, or the riskless part of the
risky technologys returns (a decomposition which we ignore for the time being). To
support this allocation as an equilibrium, pt must be su¢ ciently high (
0(k0t) low) and
qt su¢ ciently low (g
0(k1t) high). So the aggregate risk-premium, Et(Rt+1g(k1t))=k1t 
Rt+1=k0t, has to be correspondingly high.11,12
3.2 Workers do Save on Personal Account
Assume a dened benet pension plan and that workers can save on personal account,
and let a!yt > 0. The pension benet, bt+1, is a riskless asset held by the worker.
Suppose, given bt+1, workers are at a portfolio optimum. Now let bt+1 be cut, so
that fDBt declines also. This will be met with an increase in wt, dwt =  dfDBt
and da!yt =  dfDBt , with da!yt being invested in riskless assets, thereby restoring the
original equilibrium. In terms of equation (27), H!t3dwt + d
f
0tptk0t = 0 (with H
!
t3 =
 1), so pt does not change. If, for example, a!yt does not increase to o¤set the decline
in pension contributions, the demand for riskless and risky assets declines. In turn,
aggregate safe and aggregate risky investment decline.13 This leads to the following
10Mankiw (1986) was one of the rst papers to investigate the implications of borrowing constraints
on the expected equity risk premium. Lucas (1994) provides an detailed analysis the impact of
borrowing and short sales constraints on the risk premium, when labour income is subject uninsurable
shocks.
11Notice that here the equity premium is high when pt is high. This means that a high equity
premium corresponds to a low value of the riskless rate of interest.
12Applying a well-known result of Arrow (1971), Diamond and Geanakoplos (2004) show, holding
the contribution rate, ft, xed, substituting a small amount of dened contribution for a riskless
dened benet pension, raises the welfare of both rentiers and workers. The dened contribution
plan is the same as a savings account for the worker, with the worker choosing the investment
allocation. The introduction of the dened contribution plan increases the holding of risky assets
by pension plans, f1t+1ptk1t, at the expense of safe assets, 
f
0t+1ptk0t. Then pt decreases and qt
rises, so the expected risk premium declines. Workers who are old at the time of the substitution,
whose pension plan allocation is already determined, benet from the substitution only through a
rise in the safe rate of interest. Young workers gain by holding some small amount of the risky
asset. Let df1tptk1t =  df0tptk0t, then dW=df1tptk1t = Et[W 0(c!ot)(Rt+1   Rt+1)] > 0. In the
neighbourhood of f0tptk0t = 0, Et[W
0(c!ot)(R

t+1   Rt+1)] = W 0(c!ot)(Et(Rt+1)  Rt+1) > 0, and so
the date t workers benet from the aggregate risk-premium.
13Hemming and Harvey (1983) examined the extent to which (dened benet) pension plan and
non-pension retirement saving are either substitutes or indeed complements. They found some
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proposition:
Proposition 1. If bt+1 is su¢ ciently high that !0t  0 binds, then qt must be
lower and pt must be higher. This leads to a higher value of k0t and lower value of
k1t. The aggregate risk premium must be correspondingly higher.
Proof. For su¢ ciently high bt+1, workers will choose !0t = 0, so that a
!
yt is
invested entirely in risky assets. For higher values of bt+1, unless workers can short-
sell the safe technology, they are forced to a corner solution and the economy will
under-invest in the risky technology. To see the implications of this, in equations
(23) and (24) set f0tptk0t > 0 and H
!
t = 0 and 
f
1tq

t g(k1t) = 0 and raise 
f
0tptk0t. In
equation (19), as H!t = 0, the higher 
f
0tptk0t, the higher pt. Hence, to satisfy (24),
qt must be lower. From (18) and (19), k0t increases and k1t declines This dampens
but it does not o¤set the e¤ects on pt and qt . Thus the aggregate risk premium must
be correspondingly higher.14
This last result has similarities with that in Constantanides et al (2002). They
develop a three-period overlapping generations model, in which the rst (junior) gen-
eration is constrained not to be able to borrow to buy equity. This means that
equity prices are lower and bond prices higher than otherwise, which raises the risk-
premium. Their model thus o¤ers an explanation of the Mehra and Prescott (1985)
equity-premium puzzle. In the present model, the same result arises if workers cannot
undo the excess holding of the safe asset by the pension plan, because they cannot
borrow against pension plan assets to buy shares in the risky technology.
4 Company Financial Policy
We have seen how the investment policy of a dened benet pension plan can a¤ect
the technological choices of the economy. We now examine the role of the nancial
policy of the risky technology and how this impacts upon the previous results. We
propose only to examine simple capital structures made up of debt and equity. The
evidence of complementarity, which of course runs entirely counter to the perfect substitutes re-
quirement needed for neutrality. They do not, however, consider how this relationship is a¤ected by
the extent to which the occupational plan is funded through sponsor or worker contributions.
Borsch-Supan and Reil-Held (1997) review what is known about the relationship between the level
of risk and substitution among components of retirement income.
14Exley, Mehta and Smith (1997) discuss the relationship of the asset allocation of DB plans
relative to shareholders personal portfolios. They argue that o¤setting transactions needed to
obtain neutrality are easy to implement. The present paper does not take this view.
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risky technology produces a composite good, which can be unbundled into separate
debt and equity return packets that can be marketed to investors separately. The
risky technology is a portfolio of two claims, levered-equity, S1t, and debt, B1t:
V1t = B1t + S1t. (29)
We begin by considering the case of riskless debt.
Production decisions are again made by rentiers before any shares and debt are
sold to the pension plan or to workers, but with rentiers anticipating the market
clearing prices for shares and debt issued by the risky technology and shares in the
safe technology. Returns to the risky technology are given by Rt+1g(k1t) dt+1, which
are packaged as riskless debt, which pays D1t+1, and equity which pays Rt+1g(k1t) 
dt+1  D1t+1. Both the dened benet pension and debt are riskless if Rt+1g(k1t)  
dt+1  D1t+1  0 for all realisations of Rt+1g(k1t)  dt+1 so that
B1t = ptD1t+1. (30)
An important addition to the model is that we allow young rentiers and workers
to borrow and lend with each other. Let L!t ? 0 and Lst ? 0 represent the holdings
of personal loans (borrowing is negative) by workers and rentiers respectively. There
are no direct loan market transactions with the pension plan. We assume that the
market borrowing rate equals the lending rate, denoted by rt+1, and that L!t +L
s
t = 0.
Let s1t and 
s
1t represent the shares of the risky technologys equity and debt held
in the portfolio of the representative rentier. The rentiers optimisation problem is to
choose csyt, a
s
yt, L
s
t , 
s
0t, 
s
1t and 
s
1t to solve:
maxfU(csyt) + EtU(csot)g (31)
subject to
esyt = c
s
yt + a
s
yt + L
s
t ; (32)
asyt = 
s
0tptk0t + 
s
1tS1t + 
s
1tB1t; (33)
and
csot = 
s
0t(k0t) + 
s
1t(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1  D1t+1) + s1tD1t+1 + (1 + rt+1)Lst : (34)
Similarly, let f!1t; !1tg be the shares of equity and debt issued by the risky tech-
nology that are held in the workers saving account. The workers problem is to choose
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a!yt, c
!
yt, L
!
t , 
!
0t, 
!
1t and 
!
1t to solve:
maxfW (c!yt) + EtW (c!ot)g (35)
subject to
w!yt = c
!
yt + a
!
yt + L
!
t ; (36)
a!yt = 
!
0tptk0t + 
!
1tS1t + 
!
1tB1t; (37)
and
c!ot = 
!
0t(k0t) + 
!
1t[R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1  D1t+1] (38)
+!1tD1t+1 + (1 + rt+1)L
!
t + bt+1:
Finally, let ff1t; f1tg be the shares of equity and debt issued by the risky technol-
ogy held by the pension plan, then
fDBt = 
f
0tptk0t + 
f
1tS1t + 
f
1tB1t: (39)
The return on the pension plan is
f0t(k0t) + 
f
1t(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1  D1t+1) + f1tD1t+1: (40)
The benets from the dened benet pension plan are:
bt+1 = bt+1 (41)
and dt+1 = bt+1   f0t(k0t)  f1t(Rt+1g(k1t)  dt+1  D1t+1)  f1tD1t+1;
If the risky technology issues riskless debt, the debt is sold as a perfect substitute
for shares in the safe technology and the levered-equity is sold separately. Then
assuming that the rentier holds both assets, from the rst-order conditions we obtain
B1t = Et[m
s
t ]D1t+1 (42)
so that the price of a unit of debt income, qDt , is
qDt = Bt=D1t+1 = pt (43)
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and
S1t = Et[m
s
t(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1  D1t+1)] = (44)
Et[m
s
t(R

t+1g(k1t)  dt+1)] B1t = q1tg(k1t)  Et[mstd1t+1] B1t
In writing the value of equity this way, we see that there is no need for a separate
equity price, as the equity price is linearly dependent on q1t and B1t, where q

t is given
in (9).
The value of k0t is still chosen to maximise the value of the riskless technology, so
that (18) is satised, pt
0(k0t) 1 = 0. Assuming d1t+1 = 0 for all realisations of Rt+1
so that Et[mstd1t+1] = 0, then the value of k1t is chosen to maximise the value of the
risky technology, so adding (42) and (44), V1t = B1t+S1t, , then maximising V1t k1t
we obtain (19), qt g
0(k1t)   1 = 0. Of course we have not established at this stage
whether the prices pt and qt are invariant to the leveraging of the risky technology,
we turn to this in the next subsection.
When the risky technology issues riskless debt, the debt is sold as a perfect substi-
tute for shares in the safe technology and the levered-equity is sold separately. As the
value of shares in the risky technology is equal to the total value of that technology
less the value of debt, as already noted, we can think of the equity market as being a
market for this quantity and use the price qt rather than q
S
t . The equilibrium values
of fpt; qt ; k0t; k1tg as well as the value of loans Lt satisfy:
H!t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt) +H
s
t (pt; q

t ; e
s
t   zt) +B!t (pt; qSt ; wt; bt) (45)
+Bst (pt; q

t ; e
s
t   zt) + f0tptk0t + f1tB1t = ptk0t +B1t,
L!t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt) + L
S
t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt) = 0 (46)
and
S!t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt) + S
s
t (pt; q

t ; e
s
t   zt) = S1t, (47)
and the value maximisation conditions, (18) and (19). The functions B!t and B
s
t are
respectively the demand functions for debt held by workers and rentiers. S!t and S
s
t
are their respective demands for levered-equity. The asset demand functions retain
the net substitutes property and other properties of those in (27) and (28). Finally,
the loans market, for borrowing and lending between workers and rentiers is in zero
net supply. These loans will be a perfect substitute for other riskless assets with a
price of pt.
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4.1 A Modigliani-Miller Proposition
We now examine the e¤ect of changes in the composition of the liabilities nancing the
risky technology on the equilibrium of the economy. In the absence of binding capital
market constraints, when transactions on personal account are perfect substitutes
for borrowing on corporate account, we obtain a variant of Modigliani-Millers(1958)
Proposition 1.15 This result is a useful benchmark for the subsequent analysis.
Before examining the impact of company nancial policy we note the following:
Individuals will not simultaneously make riskless loans and hold shares in the safe
technology. First L!t > 0 (L
s
t < 0) only if bt+1 > 0 is low, 
!
0t > 0 and 
s
0t = 0. If
bt+1 > 0 and high, then L!t < 0 (L
s
t > 0) only if 
!
0t = 0 and 
s
0t > 0. This means that
loans are only used to purchase risky assets. We assume that workers and rentiers
can borrow and lend at the same rate as rms.
Given the type of pension plan and its nancing and taking fpt; qt ; k0t; k1tg as
given, workers and rentiers solve the above optimisation problems. Let k0t, k1t,pt, qt ,
B1t, S1t, ff0t; f1t; f1tg, f!0t; !1t; !1t; L!t g, fs0t; s1t; s1t; Lstg denote the equilibrium
values of the relevant variables.
Now consider an alternative allocation in which, other things equal, the risky
technology has an increased amount of debt. Let bk0t, bk1t, bpt; bqt bB1t, bS1t, fbf0t; bf1t; bf1tg,
fb!0t; b!1t; b!1t; bL!t g, fbs0t; bs1t; bs1t; bLstg denote the corresponding equilibrium values of
the relevant variables. For simplicity, at this stage we assume bf1t = f1t = 0, so that
the pension plan is riskless and dt+1 = 0 for all realisations of Rt+1g(k1t). We will
relax this assumption later. We state the basic Modigliani Miller proposition and
supply a straightforward proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Case 1. Let L!t > 0, 
!
0t > 0 and 
s
0t = 0, then the equilibrium of
the economy is invariant to the pension plan policy. Case 2. Alternatively let L!t < 0,
!0t = 0 and 
s
0t > 0, then again neutrality obtains.
4.2 The Dened Benet Pension Constraint and Company
Financial Policy: Riskless Debt
The dened benet pension plan promises workers benets of bt+1 = bt+1. Corpo-
rate borrowing itself allows workers access to more risk exposure per unit of equity
investment. This will only matter if the dened benet plan is so large that it is
constraining the workers to hold excess riskless assets, with the constraint !0t  0
15See Stiglitz (1969).
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binding, and workers not being able to undertake the loans described at the end of
the last section, so L!t = 0 also.
The next proposition shows that when the pension plan forces the constraint
!0t  0 to bind, workers have an increased demand for levered-equity in the risky
technology. Hence, the price of risky production is higher as is the volume of risky
production.
Proposition 3. If !0t  0 binds and L!t = 0, then an increase in the risky tech-
nologys debt level causes a substitution of production towards the risky technology
and a fall in the aggregate risk premium.
Proof. Begin at an allocation with no leverage, then the risky technology splits
its capital structure into debt and equity. Given !0t  0 is binding, workers will
voluntarily undertake a secondary trade in which they reduce their holding of bonds
issued by the risky technology, B!t = 
!
1tB1t, and buy the now levered-equity.
Rentiers who are at an interior optimum must buy !1tB1t from workers and sell
shares in the safe technology. However, at current prices they will retain their demand
for shares in the risky technology and so must be induced to sell shares. In (45) and
(47), pt falls and qt must rise. The fall in pt will lead to a decrease in safe production.
The increase in qt in turn creates an incentive to increase risky production. In this
case, Et(Rt+1g(k1t)   dt+1)=k1t declines and Rt+1=k0t rises, and the aggregate risk
premium falls. QED.
Thus we see that, absent corporate borrowing, in order to obtain risky assets,
workers have to buy a composite asset in the form of unlevered-equity, the embedded
riskless asset being locked in because of constraints. Corporate borrowing mitigates
the constraining e¤ect that limited borrowing to nance security market transactions
has on the aggregate risk-premium, so the aggregate risk premium decreases with cor-
porate borrowing so long as the workersborrowing constraint is binding. Corporate
borrowing will take place until the constraint !0t  0 no longer binds and workers
are indi¤erent to the risky technologys nancial policy.16
16This result means that institutional asset holding through the pension plan is constraining the
economys risk bearing. However, the evidence is that individuals who are not covered by pension
plans have only limited participation in the equity market. This may reect low levels of wealth or
risk tolerance and not constraints on capital market transactions.
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4.3 The Dened Benet Pension Constraint and Company
Financial Policy: Risky Debt
Now let the risky technology issue defaultable bonds that pay min(Dt+1; Rt+1k1t).
Equity now pays max(Dt+1   Rt+1k1t; 0). We begin by assuming that the pension
plan is not exposed to shortfall risk, so the pension benet is always met, so that
dt+1 is zero for all realisations of Rt+1. Therefore, we consider the case then when the
pension plan holds only riskless assets, ff1t; f1tg = 0.
If individuals can undertake the necessary transactions on personal account, the
Modigliani-Miller result generalises to rms issuing risky debt. With unrestricted
borrowing and lending and if call and put options on the risky technology can be
traded at all exercise prices, the Modigliani-Miller proposition holds. Let C1t denote
the value of a call option on the risky technology with exercise price Dt+1 and with
payo¤ function max(Rt+1g(k1t) D1t+1; 0). P1t denotes the value of a put option with
payo¤ max(Dt+1   Rt+1g(k1t); 0). Combining levered-equity, a short put option on
the risky technology with exercise price D1t+1, and riskless borrowing with face value
D1t+1, we obtain the unlevered return on the safe technology
max(Rt+1g(k1t) D1t+1; 0) max(Dt+1  Rt+1g(k1t); 0) +D1t+1 = Rt+1g(k1t). (48)
The ability to trade options for all values of Dt+1 means that the payo¤ functions
created by corporate borrowing are available through trade in options. For a given
debt-equity ratio only two options are necessary to span the payo¤s of the levered
rm through holding shares in the unlevered rm. This no-arbitrage argument means
that leverage does not create a wedge between the levered, VLt, and unlevered, VUt,
values of the risky technology. Then we have the well-known result that
VLt = Ct   Pt + ptD1t+1 = VUt. (49)
This condition implies C1t = VUt   B1t, where B1t = ptD1t+1   P1t. An alternative
interpretation of this condition, which is useful for current purposes, is that the equity
issued by the levered technology is replicated by an investment in the equity of the
unlevered technology nanced by a loan, which is collateralised by unlevered-equity.
That is if Dt+1 > Rt+1g(k1t), the borrower forfeits R

t+1g(k1t). The debt in the risky
technology is riskless debt less a put option.17
17Hellwig (1981) contains an extensive discussion of these issues. Fama and Miller (1972) and
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) also discuss these issues. The latter point out that the ability to buy
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The next step is to re-examine the workers and rentiers optimiation problems
with a riskless dened benet plan with benet level bt+1, when the risky technology
issues risky debt. Initially we assume that borrowing and lending takes place between
rentiers and workers and call and put options can be traded between rentiers and
workers. The value of the call is denoted by C1t and the put by P1t. Rentiers and
workers shares of these options are s1t and 
!
1t for the call; and 
s
1t and 
!
1t for the
put. Long and short positions must be possible if options are traded, however, an
equilibrium condition is that there is zero net trade: s1t + 
!
1t = 0 and 
s
1t + 
!
1t = 0.
The rentiers optimisation problem is to choose csyt, a
s
yt, L
s
t , 
s
0t, 
s
0t, 
s
1t 
s
1t and 
s
1t
to solve:
maxfU(csyt) + EtU(csot)g (50)
subject to
esyt = c
s
yt + a
s
yt + v
s
t , (51)
asyt = 
s
0tptk0t + 
s
1tS1t + 
s
1tB1t, (52)
vst = L
s
t + 
s
1tCt + 
s
1tPt, (53)
and
csot = 
s
0tRt+1(k0t) + 
s
1t(R

t+1g(k1t) D1t+1; 0) (54)
+s1tmin(D1t+1; R

t+1g(k1t)) + 
s
1tmax(R

t+1k1t  D1t+1; 0)
+s1tmin(D1t+1  Rt+1g(k1t); 0) + (1 + rt+1)Lst .
The workers problem is to choose a!yt, c
!
yt, L
!
t , 
!
0t, 
!
1t, 
!
1t 
!
1t and 
!
1t to solve:
maxfW (c!yt) + EtW (c!ot)g (55)
subject to
w!yt = c
!
yt + a
!
yt + v
!
t , (56)
a!yt = 
!
0tptk0t + 
!
1tS1t + 
!
1tB1t, (57)
v!t = L
!
t + 
!
1tCt + 
!
1tPt, (58)
shares on margin in this way means that the market is essentially complete. They also argue that
unless shares are held in escrow, lack of veriability may lead to multiple pledging of securities and
a breakdown of this mechanism.
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and
c!ot = 
!
0tRt+1(k0t) + 
!
1tmax(R

t+1g(k1t) D1t+1; 0) (59)
+!1tmin(D1t+1; R

t+1g(k1t)) + (1 + rt+1)L
!
t
+!1tmax(R

t+1g(k1t) D1t+1; 0) + !1tmin(D1t+1  Rt+1g(k1t); 0) + bt+1.
Before proceeding note, that in the above formulation, the call option is nothing more
than levered-equity; so the only function of the call option market is to overcome a
short-sales constraint in the equity market. It follows that if both workers and rentiers
hold long positions in equity there will be no trade in call options.
Then assuming that the rentier holds both risky debt and equity, from the rst-
order conditions we obtain
B1t = Et[m
s
t min(Dt+1; R

t+1g(k1t))] (60)
and
S1t = Et[m
s
t max(R

t+1g(k1t) Dt+1; 0)] = q1tg(k1t) B1t (61)
Risky debt is not a perfect substitute for shares in the safe technology, so it is traded
in a separate market with its own price per unit of income, qD1t. The di¤erence between
qD1t and pt reects the default risk premium given by the value of the embedded put
option. The value of the put option with exercise price Dt+1 on the whole of the risky
technology is
P1t = Et[m
s
t max(Dt+1  Rt+1g(k1t); 0)] (62)
However, we note here that in our economy if out options are traded, it will be for a
fraction 1t of this amount. This value in turn can be seen to be increasing in Dt+1.
As in the multi-asset case of Aura et al (2002), the asset demand functions retain
the net substitutes property and other properties of the demand functions in (27) and
(28). The equilibrium solution, fpt; qt ; k0t; k1tg as well as the value of loans Lt and
the put option Pt, satisfy:
H!t (pt; q

t ; q
D
t ; wt; bt) +H
s
t (pt; q

t ; q
D
t ; e
s
t   zt) + f0tptk0t = ptk0t; (63)
B!t (pt; q

t ; q
D
t ; wt; bt) +B
s
t (pt; q

t ; q
D
t ; e
s
t   zt) + f1tB1t = B1t; (64)
L!t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt) + L
S
t (pt; q

t ; wt; bt) = 0; (65)
S!t (pt; q

t ; q
D
t ; wt; bt) + S
s
t (pt; q

t ; q
D
t ; e
s
t   zt) = S1t; (66)
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and
!1tP1t(pt; q

t ; wt; bt; D1t) + 
s
1tP1t(pt; q

t ; wt; bt; D1t) = 0 (67)
and because of value maximisation (18) and (19) also. Although the put option is a
derivative security, in this set up it is not necessarily redundant as it allows agents to
trade a particular component of the corporate bond on a secondary basis after having
purchased the bond in the primary market. That is closing down the options market
will result in a di¤erent equilibrium of the economy unless markets are complete.18
The proposition below shows that corporate leverage is irrelevant if the appropriate
options are traded.
Proposition 4. If the dened benet promise, bt+1, is not forcing the constraint
!0t  0 to bind, so !0t > 0 and s0t > 0, and individuals can trade the options
contracts we have described, changes in the risky technologys nancial policy have
no e¤ect.
Proof. This is a variant of the Modigliani-Miller proposition. If it applies, then
both workers and rentiers simply hold equity and corporate debt issued by the risky
technology in the proportions issued and make o¤setting transactions in loans and
put options to replicate the initial equilibrium. To see this, note that in (59), the
sum of terms
!1tmax(R

t+1g(k1t) D1t+1; 0) + !1tmin(D1t+1; Rt+1g(k1t)) (68)
+(1 + rt+1)L
!
t + 
!
1tmin(D1t+1  Rt+1g(k1t); 0) + bt+1
can be made independent of D1t+1 provided (1+rt+1)L!t = (
!
1t !1t)D1t+1 and
!1t =  (!1t   !1t). Similarly, in (53)
s1t(R

t+1g(k1t) D1t+1; 0) + s1tmin(D1t+1; Rt+1g(k1t)) (69)
+s1tmin(D1t+1  Rt+1g(k1t); 0) + (1 + rt+1)Lst
is independent of D1t+1 provided Lst =  L!t and s1t =  (s1t   s1t) =  !1t.
QED.
Now consider the implications of workers being constrained by the pension plan.
They will have a demand for levered-equity and so the risky technologys value will be
18See Ross (1976).
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a¤ected by its nancial policy and it will have an incentive to issue bonds, lowering
its cost of capital and expanding production.
Proposition 5. If the constraint !0t  0 binds and L!t = 0, then an increase in
the leverage of the risky technology leads to a decrease in safe production, an increase
in risky production and a decline in the aggregate risk premium.
Proof. The corporate bond is a package of a riskless bond and a short put option
on the risky technology. If they could strip the riskless bond out of the corporate
bond, to overcome the constraint, !0t = 0, workers would sell the riskless part of the
bond and use the proceeds to buy levered-equity in the risky technology, now levered
by risky debt. They must also adjust their put option exposure by trading with
rentiers. From the workers perspective, this is equivalent to borrowing on margin to
buy shares in levered-equity. However, rentiers substitute the riskless component of
corporate debt for holding shares in the safe technology but retain their demand for
shares in the risky technology. The value of pt falls and this leads to a decrease in
safe production and via an increase in qt to an increase in risky production. Thus
Et(R

t+1g(k1t))=k1t declines and Rt+1=k0t rises, so that the aggregate risk premium
falls. QED.
Finally, if the riskless part of the bond cannot be sold separately, the same result
as the above could be obtained if put options can be traded, so the same exposure to
the riskless element in the bond and the put can be achieved. Matters are di¤erent
if the riskless part of the bond cannot be sold separately and put options cannot
be traded. Then the risky corporate bond cannot be hedged with put options, so
investors have to bear the default risk exposure. Because of the embedded short put
that cannot be hedged rentiers pay less for the bond. Then the workers will stop
short of selling enough bonds to buy the same amount of levered-equity as in the case
above. Workers are e¤ectively retaining more safe assets; so pt falls by less and qt rises
by less, and hence the aggregate risk premium is relatively higher.
5 Corporate Financial Policy and Pension Plan
Risk
With a dened benet pension plan, if the pension plan holds risky assets and the
risky technology issues defaultable debt, the pension promise, bt+1, is exposed to plan
sponsor risk. It itself has the features of a risky corporate bond. If the pension
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benet is exposed to plan sponsor risk in this way, workers either demand higher
wages, higher pension benets, or insurance against the pension plan shortfall. But
this insurance can only be paid for sure if the economy has achieved this income
level for sure. It is equivalent to a one-hundred percent funding requirement for the
plan itself.19 In the current model, either the risky technology must hold a bu¤er of
riskless assets, such that the pension promise can be met for sure; or if insurance is
purchased from rentiers, they themselves hold su¢ cient riskless assets. If the risk of
the pension is covered by insurance, the analysis is the same as with a riskless pension.
Therefore, suppose not and that the adjustment is through wages. Corporate bonds
and pensions now both have risk characteristics that vary with the risky technologys
debt-equity ratio.
In the event of default, we assume that corporate bondholders recover any residual
value in the risky technology, but this could in principle be shared directly with the
pension plan, depending upon insolvency laws and rules governing the winding up of
pension plans. Assume that the rm cannot default on the pension without declaring
bankruptcy.20 If Rt+1g(k1t) dt+1 D1t+1 < 0 the rm declares bankruptcy and pays
debt holders min[D1t+1; Rt+1g(k1t)]. The payment to pension plan in the event of
bankruptcy is then max[Rt+1g(k1t) D1t+1; 0]. 21
The pension shortfall itself is given by
dt+1 = bt+1   f0tRt+1(k0t)  f1tmax[Rt+1g(k1t)  dt+1  D1t+1; 0]
 f1tmin[D1t+1; Rt+1g(k1t)]. (70)
If the rm is solvent, then dt+1 is covered out of the rms income income. In the
event of the rm defaulting and the plan being in decit the workers are exposed to a
loss of bt+1 f0tRt+1(k0t) f1tRt+1g(k1t). From this we can see that the workers can
fully hedge the risk of being exposed to an uncovered shortfall by holding (possibly
through the pension plan) a put option that pays bt+1 f0tRt+1(k0t) f1tRt+1g(k1t)
in the event of the rm defaulting.
Suppose that in an initial allocation the pension benet bt+1 is riskless, in the sense
that any shortfall will be covered by the solvent plan sponsor with probability one.
Now let the risky technology raise debt at date t to a level that exposes the pension
19Here it should be recognised that with only one risky technology, there is no scope in the model
for risk pooling that allows transfers from in-surplus to in-decit schemes.
20In the UK, this has been the case since Pension Plan Winding Up Arrangements of 2003.
21If dt+1 < 0, then the pension plan surplus can preserve solvency of the rm when Rt+1g(k1t) 
D1t+1 < 0.
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plan to shortfall risk. If the pension benet is not constraining the workers portfolio
choice, so that bt+1 lies within the span of his optimal exposure to the riskless asset,
he will demand additional wages at date t that are su¢ cient to nance the above
set of transactions, thereby fully insuring bt+1. This replicates the situation in the
previous subsection, the riskless assets acquired on personal account replacing those
not held through the pension plan, with options transactions replicating the exposure
to the risky technology.
We maintain the assumption that the pension plan investment policy is given and
examine the e¤ect of the pension being exposed to shortfall risk through the nancial
policy of the risky technology. However, we assume that workers do not have access
to the above hedging opportunities. Hence, to adjust their risk exposure workers
have to trade claims on the technology directly. For example, instead of selling call
options on the risky technology they have to sell levered equity directly. There are
two principal cases to consider:
Case1: The constraint !0t  0 is not binding. The following proposition shows
that in this case, issuing risky debt at date t and thereby exposing the pension plan to
shortfall risk, reduces the value of the risky technology and will therefore not happen
in equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Let the rm issue risky debt and expose the pension plan to
shortfall risk. Under the conditions of Case 1, this leads to an increase in safe pro-
duction and to a decrease in the price of risky production; and thereby to a lower
level of risky production.
Proof. Given the pension plan investments, if the risky technology substitutes risky
debt for equity and exposes the pension plan to company default, to maintain the
value of the pension plan, workers will demand higher contributions, fDBt . But as
the default risk of the pension plan is (in this case) one-hundred percent correlated
with the default risk of the risky technology, to hedge the pension plan risk they will
demand less levered-equity. They are, however, unable to buy a long put option, but
will sell risky debt (which has an embedded short put). However, they can increase
their demand for the riskless asset, so !0t is higher. To induce rentiers to participate
in o¤setting transactions, pt must be higher. The higher value of pt implies higher
safe production and via a fall in qt , lower risky production. QED.
Case 2: The constraint !0t  0 is binding and L!t = 0. In this case matters are
quite di¤erent to the above. Now exposing the pension plan to shortfall risk through
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the issuance of risky debt, will increase the demand for levered-equity and raises the
price of risky production, so the amount of risky debt issued and risky production
will be relatively high in equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Let the pension plan be exposed to shortfall risk. Under the
conditions of Case 2, this will lead to a decrease in safe production and an increase in
risky production and consequent decrease in the aggregate risk premium. However,
for su¢ ciently high levels of company risky debt, the risk of the pension crosses a
threshold, such that the constraint, !0t  0 no longer binds and the argument of Case
1 applies.
Proof. Consider an initial allocation with no risky debt, where the dened benet
plan is constraining the workers choice, with the constraint !0t  0 binding and
L!t = 0. The risky technology now issues risky debt, thereby exposing the pension
plan to the risk of default. Workers will demand higher contributions, fDBt . With
the constraint !0t  0 binding, workers sell debt in the risky technology and increase
their holding of levered-equity in that technology. Rentiers participate in o¤setting
transactions. The riskless part of the risky debt substitutes for their holding of shares
in the safe technology. This causes a fall in pt. The lower value of pt leads to a decrease
in safe production and through a rise in qt to an increase in risky production and
a consequent decrease in the aggregate risk premium. This applies so long as the
constraint on the workers problem is binding and so is monotonic. Therefore, at
some level of risky debt issuance, the risk of the pension crosses a threshold such
that the constraint !0t  0 no longer binds. Then, Case 1, applies and there is no
incentive to issue more debt. QED.
Proposition 6 shows that if the dened benet pension is large and is at risk,
resulting from the leverage of the sponsoring technology, workers will want to undo
this exposure. In this case, the non-neutrality of company nancial policy is not the
result of binding borrowing constraints but arises from an inability of workers to fully
hedge the resulting risk exposure. Hence, workers may hold low amounts of equity
because that is necessary to reduce exposure to sponsor risk. Indeed if participation
costs in the equity market are added to the model, the risk of default on pension plan
obligations may cause workers not to participate in the equity market. 22
22This case becomes stronger if wages are also subject to risks correlated with those of the risky
technology.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has presented a simple yet illustrative general equilibrium analysis of the
impact of pension plan funding and asset allocation on the economys technology
choices and asset prices. The results depend crucially upon the constraints facing
workers in the capital market. If (occupational) pension plans make up a signicant
proportion of workers retirement income, then dened benet plans can distort the
economys portfolio composition and technology choices towards the safe technology.
This will be undone to the extent that workers take o¤setting transactions with the
other elements of their portfolio, which theory predicts they will. However, this would
mean that we observe members of dened benet pension plans holding signicant
amounts of equity on personal account that may involve borrowing against pension
plan assets to purchase them. There is little evidence of this.
The analysis in the paper shows that if workers are constrained in the capital mar-
ket, then large pension decits will interact with company nancial policy. In par-
ticular, leveraging the risky technology may allow workers to undo an over-exposure
to riskless investments, which improves risk sharing in the economy, leading to more
risky production than otherwise and a reduced aggregate risk premium.
If the risky technology issues defaultable debt, matters are more complex. This
is particularly so if the pension plan holds risky assets and is exposed to shortfall
risk. For a given amount of defaultable debt and relatively small pension benets,
the shortfall risk to the pension plan will be small. If this is the case, then capital
market constraints on the workers will be the dominant factor and the implications of
leveraging the risky technology are the same as in the case of fully funded pensions.
However, when pension plan shortfall risk is large, the workers borrowing constraint
no longer applies and the dominant motive is that of hedging pension plan shortfalls.
Workers demand compensation for bearing this risk and for undertaking the hedging.
Then the risky rm does not benet from debt issue, so the economy will undertake
relatively more safe production.
Corporate default risk will a¤ect the value of pensions. The correlation between
pension plan shortfall and company default only arises if the pension is underfunded.
Introducing more than one risky technology into the economy creates diversication
opportunities. This means that the risk-return opportunities for investors are im-
proved. This will have implications for the balance of investment in the economy
between safe and risky investment. However, it also means that the pension plan can
deliver a given benet with lower risk. For example, assume a joint normal probability
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distribution of returns on the multiple risky technologies and suppose that we create
a composite risky asset that holds risky assets in the proportions issued, which is the
market portfolio. For a given pension plan portfolio composition between safe and
risky assets, the value at risk due to unexpected loss (or shortfall) will be decreasing
in the number of assets in the risky portfolio. However, unless the pension plan is
fully funded with riskless assets, the leverage of the plan sponsor a¤ects the risk of
the pension plan, so that the principal arguments of the paper still apply.
In the case described above the correlation between pension plan shortfall and plan
sponsor solvency plays a key role. Pension plan diversication reduces this correlation.
However, default on the plan decit still depends upon the risk of the plan sponsor.
It is this risk that workers must hedge. Ideally they do this with the appropriate level
of insurance or put options. But if these opportunities are not available, it must take
place through a policy that optimises shortfall risk exposure as part of the general
portfolio problem.
The results in the paper on the impact of the scale of dened benet pension plan
benets on the general equilibrium of the economy and the interaction with the plan
sponsors nancial policy are essentially macroeconomic. These results can be gener-
alised to the case of many risky technologies, where propositions concern aggregates
of dened benet pensions and the composition of aggregate balance sheets. Propo-
sitions about risk premia will then also relate to index risk premia and not individual
stocks.
Finally, we turn to the absence of trade between generations. The model presented
only allows trade within a generation and does not allow for trade between generation.
Hence it is a stochastic variant of the type of economy examined by Diamond (1965),
but with no social security system or government bonds. If we were to extend the
analysis to consider its dynamic properties more fully, there will exist the possibility of
over-accumulation of real assets and hence the possibility of a social security system or
other forms of intergenerational transfers raising welfare.23 There may also be welfare
gains to insurance schemes that reallocate resources at a moment in time between
generations. These will in turn be more complex if we introduce labour income risk
by allowing, for example, shocks to the endowment of labour.
23Although in our model we allow workers limited participation in equity markets, the Diamond
and Geanakoplos (2004) argument that the social security system itself should have a funded element
that is invested in equities may stiill apply. That will depend upon the nature of the constraints
that bind in the economy absent the system.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Case 1. Suppose to begin with that in the new allocation,
rt+1 = brt+1; k0t = bk0t; and k1t = bk1t. Keeping the funding level of the pension plan, ft,
xed, the plan simply substitutes debt for equity. With bf0t = f0t and bf1t = f1t = 0
xed,
fDBt = bf0tbk0t + bf1t bB1t; (71)
and this yields
bt+1 = bf0tRt+1(bk0t) + bf1t bD1t+1 (72)
at date t+ 1. This return on the plan is unchanged if bf1t bD1t+1 = f1tD1t+1, which at
given rt+1 implies that bf1t bB1t+1 = f1tB1t+1, so that given bB1t+1 > B1t+1, bf1t < f1t.
In the original situation, in (38) the workers exposure to D1t+1 is  (!1t   !1t).
Given the new value of bf1t < f1t and bD1t+1 > D1t+1, the representative worker
maintains b!0t = !0t and b!1t = !1t and reduces lending, bL!t , and also increases his
holding of corporate bonds, b!1t, such that
bL!t = L!t + [(b!1t   b!1t) bB1t   (!1t   !1t)B1t]. (73)
Workers consumption in the new situation is given by
bc!ot = b!0t(bk0t) + b!1t[Rt+1bk1t   bD1t+1] (74)
+b!1t bD1t+1 + (1 + rt+1)bL!t + bt+1;
but on substituting (73), b!0t = !0t and b!1t = !1t, this is the same as (38).
Now consider rentiers. In the original situation, with Lst < 0, they will not borrow
to purchase shares in the safe technology or riskless corporate bonds: s0t = 0 and
s1t = 0, so
csot = 
s
1t[R

t+1g(k1t) D1t+1] + (1 + rt+1)Lst : (75)
In the new situation
bcsot = bs1t[Rt+1g(bk1t)  bD1t+1] + (1 + rt+1)bLst : (76)
To replicate the original situation, the rentier should borrow
bLst = LSt   [(b!1t   b!1t) bB1t   (!1t   !1t)B1t], (77)
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and so decrease borrowing, bLst , and keep their share of equity in the risky technology
constant. But if bs1t = s1t, using (77), condition (76) is equivalent to (75). Thus, the
budget sets of both workers and rentiers are unchanged, so that the same choice of
both risky and safe assets is obtained as in the original equilibrium. Moreover, the
market equilibrium conditions remain the same. In particular, the increase in the
demand for riskless corporate bonds by workers exactly matches the increase in the
supply, with borrowing and lending between workers and rentiers netting out. Hence,
our original assumption that rt+1 = brt+1 is xed is justied and so rt+1 and hence pt
remain unchanged, as are qt , k0t, and k1t, which completes the argument.
Case 2. The alternative case, where L!t < 0, 
!
0t = 0 and 
s
0t > 0 is symmetric
to the above, provided workers can borrow on personal account to buy shares in
the risky technology. Even though workers are (almost certainly) more risk averse
than rentiers, this case is realistic if the riskless dened benet pension promise, bt+1,
is su¢ ciently high. Then, even if the short-sales constraint on the safe technology
binds, if workers can borrow from rentiers to buy shares in the risky technology, the
Modiglian-Miller proposition still applies.
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